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THE PATIENT HAS NOT BEEN INFORMED:
A PROPOSAL FOR A PHYSICIAN CONFLICT
OF INTEREST DISCLOSURE LAW
I. INTRODUCTION
Physicians are in a unique position to create demand for health care
services and products.' The physicians' ability to create demand is attributable
to two factors-the intimacy of the patient-physician relationship and the
technical complexity of medical knowledge.2 These two factors create an
informational imbalance between the patient and the physician that fosters the
patient's reliance on the physician's purchasing decisions, which are necessary
for treatment.3 The physician, as a learned intermediary, acts as a purchasing
agent for the patient when selecting the health care service and product mix that
is needed for the patient's treatment. Physicians select ancillary services such
1. Seventy to 90% of the health care expenditures are within the control of physicians. Mark
A. Hall, Institutional Control of Physician Behavior: Legal Barriers to Health Care Cost
Containment, 137 U. PA. L. REV. 431, 434 (1988). Insurance companies could control the amount
and type of medical services provided based on how the insurance companies reimbursed health
insurance claims. But, whenever insurance companies endeavor to determine what medicine and
how much, physicians allege that the insurance companies are practicing medicine in the corporate
form, id. at 508-11, and tortiously interfering with the patient-physician relationship, id. at 467-71.
The physician's ability to create demand is more pronounced if the service is elastic or consumable,
such as laboratory services where an unlimited number of tests may be ordered for any given
patient. OFFICE OF THE INSPECTOR GEN., DEP'T OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVS., FINANCIAL
ARRANGEMENTS BETWEEN PHYSICIANS AND HEALTH CARE BUSINESSES, REPORT TO CONGRESS
(Doe. No. OA-12-88-01410) (May 1989), reprinted in [1989-2 Transfer Binder] Medicare and
Medicaid Guide (CCH) 37,838, at 19,936 (May 1989) [hereinafter OIG REPORT].
2. Patients commonly lack the knowledge to ascertain whether a particular health care service
is necessary or is administered in an appropriate manner. Also, illnesses often produce anxiety,
dependence, and loss of self-confidence that deprive patients of the self-protective bargaining power
found in other consumer decisions. Daniel W. Brock, Commentary: Implications of New Physician
Payment Methods for Access to Health Care and Physician Fidelity to Patients' Interests, 36 CASE
W. RES. L. REV. 760, 765 (1986); see also Alexander M. Capron, Containing Health Care Costs:
Ethical and Legal Implications of Changes in the Methods of Paying Physicians, 36 CASE W. RES.
L. REV. 708, 734 (1986).
3. Arnold S. Relman, The New Medical-Industrial Complex, 303 NEw ENG. J. MED. 963, 966
(1980). The American Medical Association (AMA) has suppressed the standardization of medicine
based on science. The AMA has often unduly mystified medicine as a judgmental art that increases
the informational gap between the physician and the patient. Hall, supra note 1, at 475-78.
Physicians, in spite of the legal requirements of informed consent, resist sharing information with
their patients. Capron, supra note 2, at 734.
4. Generally, the consumer selects the goods and services that are desired from the available
alternatives. However, in medical care, the patient usually selects a physician who then makes
choices for the patient. Capron, supra note 2, at 734. The physician is often referred to as the
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as hospitals, home health care companies, 5 durable medical equipment
companies, 6  laboratories, radiologic imaging centers,7  ambulatory care
centers,' dialysis units for kidney failure,9 nursing homes,"° and other health
care entities for their patients.
In return, the various health care entities compensate physicians for their
ability to supply patients.1 ' Eight percent of physicians have a compensation
arrangement with health care entities to which they refer patients.' 2  The
financial incentives that these entities offer to physicians are often based on the
volume of patients referred or the economic value of services provided. 3
Frequently, the compensation for referrals is in the form of gifts, long-term
.gatekeeper" for the health care system. Id. at 728. Three out of four people pick a hospital based
on their physician's recommendation. Fred Bayles & Daniel Q. Haney, Dealing for Doctors: Not
a Healthy Situation, THE INDIANAPOLIS STAR, Oct. 14, 1990.
5. Home health care companies provide home drug therapy, such as chemotherapy,
postoperative pain management therapy, AIDS drug therapy, nutrition for dialysis patients, and
intravenous antibiotics. Sandy Lutz, Safe Harbor Rules Create Infusion Confusion: Physician 77es
May Put Business in a Bind, MOD. HEALTHCARE, Nov. 4, 1991, at 29. In addition, some home
health care companies provide visiting nurses and even housekeeping. Relman, supra note 3, at
964.
6. Durable medical equipment companies provide wheelchairs, hospital beds, and other medical
equipment.
7. Radiologic imaging centers feature CAT scanners and magnetic resonance imaging units,
which are the new technology that essentially performs the X-ray function. Arnold S. Relman,
Dealing with Conflicts of Interest, 313 NEw ENG. J. MED. 749, 749 (1985).
8. The word 'ambulatory' can be interchanged with the word 'outpatient' to indicate that the
patient is not required to spend the night in the health care facility in order to obtain health care.
Examples of ambulatory care services are outpatient drug and alcohol facilities, ambulatory surgical
centers, and outpatient physical therapy centers. Theodore N. McDowell, The Medicare-Medicaid
Anti-Fraud and Abuse Amendments: Their Impact on the Present Health Care System, 36 EMORY
L.J. 691, 708 (1987).
9. PAUL STARR, THE SOCIAL TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN MEDICINE 442-43 (1982). In
1972, the Medicare program was amended to provide funds for the victims of end-stage renal disease
(kidney failure). A congressional study found that most dialysis was done in the home at a cost of
$4000 to $6000 a year. Shortly after the 1972 amendment, a rapid growth in physician-owned
dialysis centers increased the dialysis cost to between $14,000 to $20,000 a year. Id.
10. Most nursing homes are owned by small investors, many of them physicians. Relman,
supra note 3, at 964.
11. See infra notes 12-14 and accompanying text.
12. OIG REPORT, supra note 1, at 19,932.
13. United States v. Tapert, 625 F.2d 111 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1034 (1980).
Hospital Corporation of America told a group physician practice of gynecologists which admissions
and procedures were the most profitable for the hospital. Bayles & Haney, supra note 4.
Psychiatric Institutes of America (PIA) paid 90% of Recovery Line's expenses in return for 20 to
60 patient referrals a month. Recovery Line workers infiltrated Alcoholics Anonymous and other
groups to find patients for PIA. PIA then billed Texas' Crime Victims' Compensation Fund the
maximum charge of $25,000 for each patient. PIA Suit Charges Kickbacks, Fraudulent Bills, MOD.
HEALTHCARE, Sept. 23, 1991, at 3.
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credit arrangements, business equipment, medical equipment, office space, or
personnel services. 4
Physicians are also acquiring equity interests in various health care
companies. Physicians then refer their patients to the physician-owned
facilities, thus getting paid for referrals through dividends.16 Twelve percent
of physicians have an ownership interest in entities to which they make patient
referrals.' 7 Nationally, referring physicians own in whole or in part at least
twenty-five percent of independent clinical laboratories, twenty-seven percent of
independent physiological laboratories, and eight percent of durable medical
equipment companies 8  In essence, health care entities have vertically
integrated by developing business relationships with physicians."
14. The results of a 1987 survey of 114 hospitals showed that 95% of the hospitals used income
guarantees to encourage physicians to refer patients to their facility, 88% of the hospitals gave
physicians unspecified assistance to start a practice, 52% provided free office space, and 36% gave
interest free loans. Bayles & Haney, supra note 4. Ophthalmologists accepted free vacations and
expensive office equipment from manufacturers of intraocular lens implants that are needed for
cataract surgery. Relman, supra note 7, at 750; see also OIG REPORT, supra note I, at 19,932.
15. Relman, supra note 7, at 749. An equity interest is an ownership interest as distinguished
from a compensation arrangement.
16. The physician benefits twice, once by providing medical advice and again as an investor
in the recommended facility. Id. at 750.
17. The Office of the Inspector General (OIG) found it difficult to obtain physician ownership
information because many states do not keep or update adequately a full listing of owners, partners,
or investors of registered entities in the state. Also, owners did not have to qualify their name with
M.D., making it difficult for the OIG to discern physician owners. OIG REPORT, supra note 1, at
19,931. Now, a Unique Physician Identification Number (UPINs) must be placed on all medicare
reimbursement forms to facilitate the OIG's future efforts to identify self-referral arrangements and
their impact. Medicare and Medicaid Guide (CCH), Report No. 669 (Sept. 6, 1991) (Pursuant to
Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1990 (P.L. 101-508)). But see The Ethics in Patient
Referrals Act of 1989: Hearings before the Subcomm. on Health and the Subcomm. on Oversight
of the House Comm. on Ways and Means, 101st Cong., 1st Sess. (1989). The AMA's survey, in
contrast to the OIG Report, found that seven percent of physicians refer patients to a facility where
the physician has an ownership interest. Id.
18. These were the only health care entities studied by the OIG. OIG REPORT, supra note 1,
at 19,932.
19. Vertical integration, in the health care context, consists of developing a "feeder system"
of patients by owning entities that provide different aspects of patient care. For instance, a hospital
that owns an outpatient physical therapy center can generate a referral stream by recommending its
physical therapy center to continue monitoring the patient's care after hospital care is no longer
needed. McDowell, supra note 8, at 709-11. A hospital or group of physicians using their
dominant market position to steer patients to a particular ancillary service, such as a physical therapy
center, may be monopolizing or capturing the ancillary service. Physicians and other health care
providers are preventing patients' free choice among competitors. David Burda, FTC Looking at
Provider Self-Referrals, MOD. HEALTHCARE, Feb. 3, 1992, at 14. The Federal Trade Commission
(FIC) is examining the antitrust implications of provider self-referral arrangements. Two physician-
owned home medical equipment companies in California and a physician-owned lithotripsy service
in Tennessee are being investigated by the FTC. David Burda, Outlook Ominous after Probes into
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Business relationships between physicians and for-profit health care entities
can weaken the fiduciary duty that the physician owes the patient. A physician
cannot easily serve the patient's best interests when the physician has an
economic arrangement with a profit-seeking business that regards those patients
as consumers.' Physicians have aligned themselves with health care entities
that compete in the market for consumers. Health care businesses employ
marketing to encourage utilization, which enhances profits.2 The greater the
volume of health care that is sold, the greater the profits that physicians and
other health care providers reap.'
Traditionally, physicians have been compensated by the fee-for-service
payment mechanism.' Under this arrangement, the physician is paid a fee for
each service performed; thus the physician who performs more procedures
increases his or her personal income.' The conflict of interest between the
physician's personal financial gain and doing what is in the patient's best interest
is not new, and in many instances it is readily apparent to the patient.2
However, referral payments create a more subtle conflict of interest.' The
patient is unaware of the physician's financial or ownership interest in the
entities referred and cannot assess how this conflict of interest may prejudice the
physician's judgment as to the quality or medical necessity of treatment.2
In addition, while a patient respects a physician's medical judgment on
purchasing decisions, the patient implicitly trusts the physician's business
judgment on these same purchasing decisions. The patient trusts that the
Provider Ownership, MOD. HEALTHCARE, Jan. 6, 1992, at 56.
20. The patient's medical needs and the corporation's financial objectives are not always
identical. Arnold S. Relman, Practicing Medicine in the New Business Climate, 316 NEw ENG. J.
MED. 1150, 1150 (1987). See generally Letters to the Editor, Conflicts ofInterest and the Physician
Entrepreneur, 314 NEw ENG. J. MED. 250 (1986) [hereinafter Letters to the Editor].
21. The president of Humana, one of the largest for-profit hospital chains, commented that the
company markets its hospitals coast to coast like the McDonald's hamburger. STARR, supra note
9, at 431.
22. Relman, supra note 3, at 965-66.
23. Fifty percent of the physicians are compensated by the fee-for-service payment mechanism.
Twenty percent of the physicians receive a salary and the remaining 30% receive a mixed
compensation form of salary and fee-for-service. Capron, supra note 2, at 712.
24. Most physicians' income is affected by the quantity of service provided. Capron, supra
note 2, at 712. See generally Letters to the Editor, supra note 20. All compensation systems
present some incentive to provide too much service or not enough service. Id.
25. Relman, supra note 7, at 750.
26. Id. The "health care as business" creed is changing the behavior of physicians. Physicians
feel compelled to associate themselves with health care companies as employees or limited partners,
thus weakening the fiduciary relationship between physician and patient. Relman, supra note 20,
at 1150.
27. Theodore N. McDowell Jr., Physician Self Referral Arrangements: Legitimate Business
or Unethical "Entrepreneurialism," 15 AM. J.L. & MED. 61, 69-70 (1989).
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physician has referred the patient to a good quality service at the appropriate
cost, but the patient rarely audits the physician's business judgment.' Third
party payors mask the physician's business judgment from the patient." The
patient is insulated from directly paying the bulk of health care costs which are
borne by third party payors such as Medicare.' Thus, the patient who
receives health care services has little cost incentive to become informed and to
make wise consumer decisions.3' Instead, the patient allows the physician to
make many health care purchases regardless of the cost.32
This Note proposes a Physician Conflict of Interest Disclosure Law that is
to be used by the federal government in the Medicare and Medicaid programs.
The Medicare and Medicaid programs' structure and payment mechanisms have
influenced the entire health care system. These programs have, perhaps
inadvertently, created the incentives for physicians to align with for-profit health
care entities. Therefore, the Medicare and Medicaid programs are the
appropriate place to begin reform. This disclosure law can best be implemented
as a requirement to receiving governmental Medicare and Medicaid funds. This
Note will not discuss constitutional concerns that may exist if a federal
disclosure law is mandated for physicians not serving Medicare and Medicaid
patients.33
28. United States v. Porter, 591 F.2d 1048 (5th Cir. 1979). Physicians sent their patients'
blood samples to a manual laboratory that charged $100 for an SMA-12 battery of blood tests. An
automatic laboratory, located in the area, charged seven dollars for the same battery of blood tests.
The automatic laboratory's quality of work was deemed as good if not better than the manual
laboratory by the medical profession. The physicians who sent their patients' blood samples to the
manual laboratory owned 60% of the manual laboratory's stock. Id.
29. The insured patient is no longer a consumer, but a claimant of health care regardless of the
cost. Relman, supra note 3, at 966.
30. The consumption decision is separated from the payment responsibility. McDowell, supra
note 8, at 700. The governmentpays nearly half of the nation's health care bill. RICHARD SORIAN,
THE BITrER PILL: TOUGH CHOICES IN AMEICA'S HEALTH POLICY 105 (1988).
31. McDowell, supra note 8, at 700-02. Commentators often attribute overtreatment to the
availability of health insurance. Insurance distorts the patient's attitude about the relative benefit of
medical interventions because the patient does not directly pay for the treatment. Insurance
encourages the patient's demand for medical care because the patient receives all of the benefits, yet
bears little of the costs of treatment. Capron, supra note 2, at 747.
32. Health care is perceived as a public good because much of the cost of medical research,
medical care, and physicians' medical education is subsidized by public funds. Thus, most citizens
demand health care as a basic right. Relman, supra note 3, at 966. The patient expects the best
health care regardless of the cost. The patient's "spare no expense" expectations coincide with the
physician's ethical duty to do everything possible for the patient no matter what the cost. Hall,
supra note 1, at 516. Interestingly, the physician's ethical duty to do everything that is of medical
benefit for the patient, regardless of cost, happens also to be in the physician's best economic
interest. Brock, supra note 2, at 766.
33. A federal physician conflict of interest disclosure law raises the constitutional issues of
forced speech and interference with the state's power to license and regulate physicians.
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This Note concludes that while physician ownership and compensation
arrangements create innovative health care entities that may provide less costly
health care, the patient should be informed of these financial arrangements.
Section II of this Note discusses how the structure and payment mechanisms of
the Medicare and Medicaid programs encourage the proliferation of business
arrangements between physicians and other health care entities. Section II also
explains that abuse of Medicare and Medicaid funds is essentially a manifestation
of the physician's conflict of interest. Section III examines the regulation of
physician self-referral arrangements. Finally, Section IV analyzes various state
disclosure laws and proposes a necessary federal Physician Conflict of Interest
Disclosure Law.
II. THE MEDICARE AND MEDICAID PROGRAMS AND THEIR IMPACT
ON THE HEALTH CARE SYSTEM
In 1965, Lyndon B. Johnson established the Medicare and Medicaid
programs as part of "The Great Society" effort to eliminate poverty.' Poor
health was deemed an integral component in the cycle of poverty.35 The
emphasis of the Medicare and Medicaid programs was to include the elderly and
the poor in the health care system.3 6
Physicians immediately denounced these programs as socialism.37 The
AMA lobbied strongly against the programs, arguing that they would destroy the
physicians' ability to make medical decisions in the best interest of their patients
34. President Kennedy initiated the "unconditional war on poverty in America" to rally
Americans to a positive cause. Shortly after President Kennedy's assassination, President Johnson
implemented President Kennedy's cause. STARR, supra note 9, at 366-67.
35. Id. Although many elderly Americans now lead vibrant and healthy lives, it was not too
long ago that the elderly were among the nation's poorest and least cared for groups. When he
signed the Medicare law, President Johnson said:
No longer will illness crush and destroy the savings that they have so carefully put away
over a lifetime so that they might enjoy dignity in their later years. No longer will
young families see their own incomes, and their own hopes, eaten away simply because
they are carrying out their deep moral obligations to their parents, and to their uncles
and to their aunts.
SORIAN, supra note 30, at 90.
36. There was extensive grassroots support for the Medicare program among the aged, who
exerted strong pressure on Congress. In addition, the civil rights movement was asserting the need
for equality in the access to medical care. STARR, supra note 9, at 368.
37. Since 1930, the federal government had made various attempts to have some form of public
health insurance, but was unsuccessful due to the strong, cohesive, AMA lobby. McDowell, supra
note 8, at 694; see also STARR, supra note 9, at 280-89.
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because the government would be regulating those decisions.' To gain
physician and hospital participation in the program, the Medicare Act guaranteed
freedom from "any supervision or control over the practice of medicine or the
manner in which medical services are provided. 3 9 The federal government
allowed physicians to decide what health care was needed and the amount of
health care that should be provided.'
A. The Structure and Payment Mechanisms of the Medicare and
Medicaid Programs
The Medicare and Medicaid programs are structured to preserve physicians'
autonomy from governmental control. 4 Medicare Part A generally pays for
an elderly patient's institutional care, such as inpatient hospital care.42
Medicare Part B largely covers physicians' services for the elderly. 3 To
administer the Medicare program, the federal government contracted with
private insurance companies." Typically, the federal government chose Blue
Cross & Blue Shield as the fiscal intermediary in each state. 5
38. The AMA's argument, that a national insurance plan threatened the patient-physician
relationship, could no longer defeat the public's growing demand to be included in the health care
system. STARR, supra note 9, at 368-69. Interestingly, the patient-physician relationship is fast
becoming controlled by financial objectives, as opposed to government regulation. Relman, supra
note 20, at 1150. The "health care as business" creed has interfered with the patient-physician
relationship. Hall, supra note 1, at 514.
39. 42 U.S.C. § 1395 (1988).
40. The physicians and the hospitals threatened to boycott the program. In order to get the
program underway, the Medicare Act accommodated the physicians and the hospitals in both
structure and payment mechanisms. STARR, supra note 9, at 375-76.
41. Hall, supra note 1, at 446.
42. Medicare Part A also covers extended care services (nursing homes), home health services,
and hospice care for individuals who are age 65 or over and are eligible for retirement benefits.
Medicare Part A also covers all persons who have end-stage renal disease (kidney failure). 42
U.S.C. § 1395c (1988).
43. Medicare Part B also covers durable medical equipment, ambulatory surgical center
services, hospital outpatient services, and outpatient physical therapy services. Medicare Part B is
a voluntary insurance program that provides medical insurance benefits for aged and disabled
individuals who elect to enroll in the program. The program is financed from enrollees' premium
payments and funds appropriated by the Federal Government. 42 U.S.C. §§ 1395j-w (1988).
44. The payment scheme mirrored that of private insurance companies, reimbursing for the
reasonable cost or reasonable charge of the health care provided. McDowell, supra note 8, at 698.
45. This was a structural accommodation to the physicians and hospitals. Blue Cross & Blue
Shield, a private insurance company, was established by the AMA and the American Hospital
Association (AHA) during the 1940's in response to the federal government's endeavor to create
public health insurance. McDowell, supra note 8, at 694. The structure of the Medicare program
even coincides with the structure of the AMA's and the AHA's private insurance company. Blue
Cross administers Medicare Part A, whereas Blue Shield administers Medicare Part B. STARR,
supra note 9, at 375.
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Medicaid is administered by the states for the benefit of the poor.' The
states determine who is eligible for their Medicaid programs and what services
the program will provide.47 The states have great discretion in deciding how
to administer the Medicaid programs.' Indeed, some states have a Medicaid
program that is based on the Health Maintenance Organization (HMO)
format.49 The federal government provides funds in the form of matching
grants to help subsidize these state programs.50
By delegating the administration of the Medicare program to the private
insurance companies and delegating the administration of the Medicaid program
to the states, the federal government lost direct control of the programs at the
outset. 5  By delegating the administration of the programs, the federal
government also lost control of the cost of the programs.52 Additionally, the
federal government paid for the Medicare Part A program on a cost or cost-plus
basis.53 In contrast, the federal government paid for the Medicare Part B
program using a customary charge basis, which is essentially a fee-for-service
payment mechanism.54 The reimbursement mechanisms provided an incentive
to overuse and overcharge for health care services. 5
46. The federal government gives grants to the states for the purpose of enabling each state,
as far as is practical under the conditions in the state, to furnish medical assistance to those whose
income is insufficient to meet the costs of necessary medical services. 42 U.S.C. § 1396 (1988).
47. The federal government must approve the states' Medicaid plans before grants are given.
Id.
48. Unlike the Medicare program, the Medicaid program does not have uniform national
standards for eligibility and benefits and is not bolstered by the Social Security Tax. STARR, supra
note 9, at 370.
49. Health Maintenance Organization Act of 1973, 42 U.S.C. § 300e-17 (1988). A health
maintenance organization (HMO) is a health care organization that effectively uses a pool of patients
to contract for needed health care services for the patient members at a fixed lump sum payment.
See FLA. STAT. ANN. § 409.266(c) (West 1986) for a state that uses a HMO format for its Medicaid
program.
50. 42 U.S.C. § 1396 (1988).
51. McDowell, supra note 8, at 698.
52. Id.
53. Prior to the Medicare and Medicaid programs, Congress attempted to improve public access
to health care by funding many hospital capital improvements (Hill-Burton assets). The hospitals
insisted that the Medicare and Medicaid programs pay depreciation on the hospital's assets, including
the Hill-Burton assets. As an accommodation to the hospitals, Congress paid the cost of many
hospital assets plus the depreciation of those same assets, which is a cost-plus-payment mechanism.
STARR, supra note 9, at 375.
54. Physicians were paid according to what the individual physician customarily charged for
the service, not the cost of the physician's service. The customary charge was controlled by the
area's prevailing charge to determine whether the individual physician's charge was reasonable.
Capron, supra note 2, at 713-15.
55. Hospitals, under the cost-based reimbursement mechanism, spent lavishly to provide the
latest technology, justifying the higher cost as necessary for the care of the patient. Harvey E. Pies,
Control of Fraud and Abuse in Medicare and Medicaid, 3 AM. J.L. & MED. 323, 326 (1977).
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In 1965, when the programs were initiated, national health care
expenditures accounted for nearly six percent of the Gross National Product
(GNP), or forty-seven billion dollars.56  Currently, national health care
expenditures account for fourteen percent of the GNP, or 838 billion dollars.57
Furthermore, health care costs have consistently risen more rapidly than the
general rate of inflation.' One study conducted to determine why health care
costs rise quicker than the inflation rate found that three to ten percent of total
health care expenditures are caused by fraud and abuse.59
As health care costs increase, so does the pressure from taxpayers, labor
leaders, and employers to contain the costs.' However, no one wants the
quality or accessibility of health care services to be diminished.6 ' The premise
of cost containment is that costs can be reduced without sacrificing service,
because many of the procedures done could be foregone without harming the
patient. 62 In an effort to contain health care costs, the federal government
replaced the cost based reimbursement system in the Medicare Part A program
with the Prospective Payment System (PPS) in 1982.63
The PPS reimburses hospitals based on a Diagnosis-Related Group (DRG)
concept.' The DRG provides a predetermined rate for each patient depending
Physicians inflated the "customary charge" rate for a procedure by raising the amount the physician
charged for the procedure. This increased the charge for their particular patient and the higher
customary charge for all combined patients also inflated the prevailing charge in that locality.
Capron, supra note 2, at 714.
56. Eli Ginzberg, Sounding Board-A Hard Look at Cost Containment, 316 NEW ENG. J. MED.
1151 (1987).
1 57. Eric Weissenstein, Health Spending Hits $838 Billion in 1992, MOD. HEALTHCARE, Jan.
11, 1993, at 2.
58. SORIAN, supra note 30, at 105. In 1982, when overall inflation was five percent, hospital
costs rose 15.5%. Id. at 112.
59. The 21 page study was done by a task force consisting of the Justice Department, the Health
and Human Services Department, and the White House Office of Management and Budget. David
Burda, 3 Agencies Wish for More Fraud, Abuse Laws, MOD. HEALTHCARE, Jan. 18, 1993, at 3.
60. Changes in the health care system are affected by the financial concerns of the third parties
who pay most health care bills, the government and employers. Relman, supra note 20, at 1150.
61. Id.
62. Hall, supra note 1, at 444. For example, gynecologists often recommend annual pap smear
tests even though testing every three years produces nearly the same increase in life expectancy.
Id. at 444 n.43.
63. 42 U.S.C. § 1395ww(d) (1988).
64. DRGs are essentially a coding system developed at Yale University from a data base of 1.4
million patient records to determine the consumption of hospital resources by individual patients
depending on their illness. From this data base, a predetermined payment rate was established for
each illness (diagnosis). Prospective Payment Systems Hospital DRG Rates, I Medicare & Medicaid
Guide (CCH) 1 4204 (Sept. 1986).
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on the patient's illness.' The actual cost that the hospital incurred to treat the
patient is no longer factored into the reimbursement equation.' Therefore, the
PPS forces the hospital to find the most economical way to treat the patient.67
Inpatient payment constraints have led to increased levels of outpatient care,
which can be provided in a less costly manner than inpatient care.' The health
care cost containment measures actually encourage new outpatient health care
businesses in an effort to provide economical health care.'
In addition, Resource Based Relative Value Scales (RBRVSs)7° were put
into effect on January 1, 1992.7' The DRG experiment in Medicare Part A is
being applied to Medicare Part B payments to physicians. 72 It is predicted that
RBRVSs may provide a further impetus for physicians to protect or supplement
their incomes by investing in other health care facilities.' Thus, the physician
will continue to develop business relationships with other health care entities.
65. Id.
66. Hospitals are allowed to retain the amount paid per diagnosis that is id excess of their costs,
but they have to absorb the costs that exceed the amount paid. Id. at 4203.
67. The fixed set of rates places hospitals at risk in the use of their resources. The Prospective
Payment System (PPS) establishes competitive market-like forces in the health care system. Id.
68. Id.
69. The strong link between payment and diagnosis encourages physician participation in the
financial affairs and operating routines of hospitals. Id.
70. The Diagnosis-Related Group (DRG) concept was applied to physicians. A predetermined
schedule of uniform physician fees, the Relative Value Units (RVUs), determines the amount of
reimbursement, as opposed to the retrospective reimbursement system of customary charge. The
physician, prior to treating the Medicare or Medicaid patient, will know the reimbursement amount.
Physicians'Medicare Fee Schedule, Medicare & Medicaid Guide (CCH), Report No. 678 (Dec. 4,
1991).
71. The payment is the lesser of the physician's actual charge or the predetermined amount
from the fee schedule. The first phase, of five annual phases, began January 1, 1992. 42 U.S.C.A.
§ 1395w-4 (West 1992).
72. Id.
73. Medicare now reimburses the physician a get amount and not whatever the physician decides
to charge. Thus, physicians may attempt to provide other health care services along with their
professional advice to receive Medicare reimbursements for both services. For example, physicians
may establish laboratories or pharmacies in their offices. Also, physicians may invest in other health
care entities, then refer their patients there. OIG REPORT, supra note 1, at 19,926. Currently, there
is a doctor surplus in this country. The growing supply of doctors encourages either physician
investment in other health care entities or furnishing the ancillary service directly as a means to
maintain or supplement their incomes. STARR, supra note 9, at 421-24, 436. In response to
RBRVSs, physicians may either try to make up for lost income by increasing patient volume
unnecessarily or pressure other health care entities into business arrangements that violate the Anti-
Fraud and Abuse Statute. David Burda, Physician Reaction to Rules Could Affect Final Outcome,
MOD. HEALTHCARE, Jan. 6, 1992, at 46.
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B. Program Abuse
Program abuse in the Medicare and Medicaid programs is essentially the
result of the physician's conflict of interest.74 Program abuse manifests itself
in three different ways: reimbursement for unacceptable medical judgment,75
reimbursement for unacceptable business judgment,76 or both. For example,
physicians do not operate according to accepted medical judgment when they
refer patients for unnecessary health care services to increase the physicians'
financial gain.' Medicare and Medicaid attempt to protect federal funds from
this type of abuse by requiring that health care services rendered be justified by
"medical necessity."' However, the medical necessity standard is elusive
because the determination of each patient's medical needs can be highly
judgmental. 79
In addition, a physician does not operate according to accepted business
judgment when referring patients for necessary care in an especially costly
setting.' Referrals are unnecessarily costly because the referral payment is
commingled with the legitimate cost of necessary health care, which is submitted
to Medicare for reimbursement.8" Referral payments drive up Medicare costs
without achieving any public benefit. Program abuse is difficult to detect for a
single transaction because of the elusive medical necessity standard and the
commingled payment.'
74. See supra notes 25-32 and accompanying text.
75. See supra notes 25-27 and accompanying text.
76. See supra notes 28-32 and accompanying text.
77. H.R. REP. No. 393, 95th Cong., 1st Sess., reprinted in 1977 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3039, 3050.
This is sometimes called "ping-ponging," which is referring a patient to another physician or another
health care entity without a medical reason for doing so. Id. at 3048.
78. The AMA's guidelines also suggest a "medical necessity" criteria for patient care.
McDowell, Jr., supra note 27, at 102.
79. Medical services are individualized because no two patients are exactly alike. Hall, supra
note 1, at 476 n.155. Also, the medical community has not attempted to discern which medical
procedures are preferable among the vast range of alternatives. Id. at 481.
80. H.R. REP. No. 393, supra note 77, at 3050. This is sometimes called "steering," which
is directing a patient to a particular health care entity, such as a pharmacy, in violation of the
patient's freedom of choice. Id. at 3048.
81. The misapplication of federal funds is apparent when payment for the one-minute referral
suggestion is added to the lkgitimate cost of the health care transaction. United States v. Hancock,
604 F.2d 999, 1001 (7th Cir. 1979). But see David M. Frankford, Creating and Dividing the Fruits
of Collective Economic Activity: Referrals Among Health Care Providers, 89 COLUM. L. REV.
1861, 1873 (1989). Referrals are based on information shared by health care providers. Since
information is not free, it is natural that payment would be made in exchange for referrals. Id.
82. See supra notes 78-81 and accompanying text. A kickback can be disguised as extra
payment; the kickback is commingled with a legitimate business payment, such as a salary. See
infra notes 149-52 and accompanying text for an example of a disguised payment.
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Although program abuse may be difficult to ascertain for a single patient
transaction, it is evident on a macroeconomic level. The Office of the Inspector
General (OIG) found that patients of referring physicians with an ownership
interest in clinical laboratories received an average of forty-five percent more
clinical laboratory services than all Medicare patients in general."3 Patients of
referring physicians who have a compensation arrangement with a clinical
laboratory received an average of thirty-two percent more laboratory services
than all Medicare patients in general.'M Patients of referring physicians known
to have ownership interests in physiological laboratories use thirteen percent
more physiological services than patients in general."5 States and universities
have conducted their own studies and have found similar results.s"
III. THE REGULATION OF PHYSICIAN SELF-REFERRAL ARRANGEMENTS
The structure and payment mechanisms used by the Medicare and Medicaid
programs have led to documented abuse.' On one level, the federal and
various state governments are trying to minimize the cost of program abuse by
83. The OIG estimated the cost of excess referrals by physician-ownersof clinical laboratories
to be $28 million. The OIG did not estimate the cost of other physician-owner referrals. OIG
REPORT, supra note 1, at 19,933-34.
84. Id. at 19,934.
85. Id.
86. Blue Cross & Blue Shield's study of 148 laboratories revealed that the average number of
services and the average payment per patient was 40% higher for patients whose physicians had an
ownership interest in the laboratory referred. MEDICAL AFFAIRS DIVISION, BLUE CROSS & BLUE
SHIELD OF MICHIGAN, A COMPARISON OF LABORATORY UTILIZATION AND PAYOUT TO OWNERSHIP,
(May 9, 1984). One study, of six selected laboratories, found that Medicaid recipients referred for
clinical laboratory services by physician-owners had an average of 41% more tests than those
referred by non-owners. MEDICAL SERVICES ADMINISTRATION, STATE OF MICHIGAN DEPARTMENT
OF SOCIAL SERVICES, UTILIZATION OF MEDICAID LABORATORY SERVICES BY PHYSICIANS
WITH/WITHOUT OWNERSHIP INTEREST IN CLINICAL LABORATORIES: A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS
OF SIX SELECTED LABORATORIES, (July 9, 1981). The New York City Department of Consumer
Affairs found markups of 400% on home infusion services. The federal government does not
reimburse for most home infusion therapies, so the companies readily admit that they pay or share
profits with physicians to induce referrals. As long as Medicare does not reimburse the referrals,
the payments do not violate the law. Lutz, supra note 5, at 32. The Florida Health Care Cost
Containment Board found that the profusion of physician-owned Magnetic Resonance Imaging (MRI)
centers in Florida caused 65% more scans per resident than in Baltimore, where MRIs are usually
hospital-owned. In 1991, the cost of the "extra" scans in Florida was $185 million. Michael L.
Millenson, A Conflict of Image in Health Care, CHI. TRIB., Feb. 23, 1992, at Cl, C2. A joint
study, done by the University of Virginia's School of Medicine and the American College of
Radiology, found that 40% of the physicians who own MRI facilities ordered imaging tests for
patients with knee pain, compared with only five percent of the physicians who do not own MRI
facilities. Also, self-referring physicians tended to have higher imaging charges than physicians
without such arrangements. David Burda, Study: Physician-Investors Refer More Patients, MOD.
HEALTHCARE, Oct. 26, 1992, at 17.
87. See supra notes 83-86 and accompanying text.
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enacting laws banning certain types of physician self-referral arrangements.88
On another level, both the federal -and many state governments have enacted
Anti-Fraud and Abuse Statutes." The Anti-Fraud and Abuse Statutes are
aimed at individual physicians that fraudulently abuse Medicare and Medicaid
funds, as opposed to a macroeconomic ban on all physician self-referral
arrangements. Also, the AMA has issued guidelines addressing the conflict of
interest present in physician self-referral arrangements. 90
A. The Laws Banning Physician Self-Referral Arrangements
In 1989, the federal government enacted a statute that prohibits, with
specified exceptions, Medicare payments to a physician who refers patients to
a clinical laboratory in which the physician has a financial interest. 9' The
statute, however, deals only with clinical laboratories and not with the many
other types of ancillary services to which physicians may refer patients. Also,
the statute contains numerous exceptions that seem to swallow the rule that
prohibits referrals to even clinical laboratories.' The law protects only a small
number of patients.
To date, five states have banned certain types of physician self-referral
arrangements. 93 These state laws also illustrate where the exceptions swallow
the rule prohibiting physician self-referral practices. For instance, the New
York law exempts referring physicians who live in rural areas. This seems like
a benign exception; however, a rural area is defined, in the New York law, as
a county with a population of 200,000 or less. The New York law exempts
forty-five of the state's sixty-two counties from its law.'
These state laws also present constitutional issues. For example, equal
protection issues exist with respect to Florida's law because the law exempts
88. See infra notes 91-99 and accompanying text.
89. See infra notes 100-188 and accompanying text.
90. See infra notes 189-96 and accompanying text.
91. Medicare & Medicaid Guide (CCH), Report No. 706 (July 30, 1992). Congressman
Fortney "Pete" Stark sponsored the self-referral bill that became law in the Omnibus Budget
Reconciliation Act of 1989 (P.L. 101-239). The statute's effective date was January 1, 1992. James
M. Gaynor Jr., The Stark Reality, CHI. HEALTHCARE, Feb. 1992, at 28.
92. For example, the statute exempts many hospital-physician financial arrangements, health
maintenance organizations, and rural or medically under-served areas. Medicare & Medicaid Guide
(CCH), Report No. 706 (July 30, 1992); James M. Gaynor Jr., The Stark Reality, CHI.
HEALTHCARE, Feb. 1992, at 28.
93. Florida, Illinois, Michigan, New Jersey, and New York have banned certain types of
physician self-referral arrangements. David Burda, Study: Physician-Investors Refer More Patients,
MOD. HEALTHCARE, Oct. 26, 1992, at 17.
94. David Burda & Karen Pallarito, New Illinois, New York Laws Address Self-Referrals, MOD.
HEALTHCARE, Oct. 5, 1992, at 14.
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hospitals and physician-owned outpatient surgery centers, but includes physician-
owned physical therapy centers. Therefore, the law targets certain physicians
while exempting other physicians and other health care providers such as
hospitals.95  Takings issues also exist. In 1995, the Florida law will bar
physicians from referring patients to health care entities in which the physician
has an ownership interest. Prior to 1995, the Florida law places caps on fees
charged by physician-owned health care centers. Physicians will have to sell
their interests in these facilities or stop referring patients to them. The law may
prevent physicians from earning reasonable returns on their investments, which
may have the effect of taking property without the due process of law."
The laws banning physician self-referral arrangements are limited and
riddled with exceptions and thus do not sufficiently protect patients. 97 The
laws also may not survive constitutional analysis." Finally, banning physician
self-referral arrangements may adversely impact the development of innovative
health care entities. 99 Physicians have directed the course of medicine in
deciding what ancillary services to provide, but who is better qualified to direct
this function? Laws banning physician self-referral arrangements may have dire
consequences on the medical infrastructure established by physicians.
Education, instead of banning physician self-referral arrangements, is necessary.
This education should take the form of the proposed Physician Conflict of
Interest Disclosure Law.
B. The Anti-Fraud and Abuse Statutes
The federal government has been monitoring and regularly strengthening
the penalty for fraud and abuse of the Medicare and Medicaid programs."°°
Currently, involvement in a referral scheme is a felony.' 0 ' Also, a physician
or health care entity found to be involved in a referral scheme may be excluded
from participating in the Medicare and Medicaid programs."°r In spite of the
95. David Burda, Providers Challenge Florida's Ban on Referrals to Facilities They Own,
MOD. HEALTHCARE, June 15, 1992, at 6. The standard of review, however, for economic or social
welfare legislation is mere rationality. The Court strongly presumes that economic legislation is
constitutional. Lindsley v. Natural Carbonic Gas Co., 220 U.S. 61 (1911).
96. Burda, supra note 95, at 6. The Taking Clause protects, to some extent, investment-backed
expectations. JOHN E. NOWAK & RONALD D. ROTUNDA, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 428 (West
Publishing Co. 1991). But the state may regulate property in a manner consistent with the state's
police power, even if the regulation substantially diminishes the property's value. Penn Cent.
Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104 (1978).
97. See supra notes 91-94 and accompanying text.
98. See supra notes 95-96 and accompanying text.
99. See infra notes 191-92 and accompanying text.
100. See infra notes 104-21 and accompanying text.
101. See infra notes 104-18 and accompanying text.
102. See infra notes 119-21 and accompanying text.
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broad statutory language and judicial interpretation, however, it is still difficult
to prosecute referral practices due to the inherent nature of referrals and the
health care business climate.'03
1. The 1972, 1977, and 1980 Medicare and Medicaid Anti-Fraud and
Abuse Statutes
In 1972, only seven years after instituting the Medicare and Medicaid
programs, Congress attempted to directly respond to fraud and abuse in the
Medicare and Medicaid programs by adding sections 1877(b) and 1909(b) to the
Social Security Act." ° Sections 1877(b) and 1909(b) prohibited the soliciting,
offering, paying, or accepting of kickbacks or bribes in connection with the
furnishing of services or items that are paid by Medicare or Medicaid to an
individual, including the rebate of any fee or charge for referrals." 5 The
crime was a misdemeanor and the punishment was not to exceed $10,000, or
imprisonment for more than one year, or both." When approving the
specific strict liability provision, Congress noted that referral practices were
regarded by professional organizations as unethical and were thought to
contribute substantially to the cost of the Medicare and Medicaid programs.'0 7
In 1977, Congressional hearings and investigations revealed "a disturbing
degree [of) fraudulent and abusive practices associated with the provision of
103. See infra notes 176-88 and accompanying text.
104. Previously, the government had relied on conspiracy to defraud the government, false
claims provisions, and other general statutes to prosecute physicians. Martha J. Yoakum, Comment,
Physician Fraud in the Medicare-Medicaid Programs-Kickbacks, Bribes, and Remunerations, 10
MEM. ST. U. L. REv. 684, 685 (1980). The 1972 provisions were in addition to other penalty
provisions in state and federal law. H.R. REP. No. 231, 92d Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted in 1972
U.S.C.C.A.N. 4989, 5094. The Government still uses conspiracy and false claims provisions to
prosecute. See also United States v. Bay State Ambulance and Hosp. Rental Serv. Inc., 874 F.2d
20 (1st Cir. 1989); United States v. Lipkis, 770 F.2d 1447 (9th Cir. 1985).
105. Social Security Act, § 1877(b), 1909(b) as amended 42 U.S.C. §§ 1395nn(b), 1396h(b)
(1976). The substantive language in § 1395nn(b)-the Medicare program-and § 1396h(b)-the
Medicaid program-is identical. The full text of 42 U.S.C. § 1396h(b) is provided below:
(b) Kickbacks, bribes, or rebates of fees or charges
Whoever furnishes items or services to an individual for which payment is or may
be made in whole or in part out of Federal funds under a State plan approved under this
subchapter and who solicits, offers, or receives any-
(1) kickback or bribe in connection with the furnishing of such items
or services or the making or receipt of such payment, or
(2) rebate of any fee or charge for referring any such individual to
another person for the furnishing of such items or services
shall be guilty of a misdemeanor and upon conviction thereof shall be fined not more
than $10,000 or imprisoned for not more than one year, or both.
106. Id.
107. H.R. REP. No. 231, supra note 104, at 5093.
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health services financed by the Medicare and Medicaid programs. " "
Fraudulent practices are disturbing because they cheat the taxpayers who pay for
program costs, divert program dollars from the elderly and the poor who were
the intended recipients of quality health service, erode the financial stability of
state and local governments that must fulfill their obligations to the medical
assistance program, and unfairly denigrate the majority of honest physicians and
health care institutions."0
In response to the 1977 Congressional hearings, Congress enacted the
Medicare-Medicaid Anti-Fraud and Abuse Amendments."' To strengthen the
penalties, Congress upgraded the offense to a felony, punishable by a fine not
108. H.R. REP. No. 393, supra note 77, at 3047. The report discusses the pervasiveness of
fraud in the Medicaid facilities, laboratories, nursing homes, and among physicians. Id. at 3047-50;
see also Pies, supra note 55, at 326 (commenting that fraud and abuse in the Medicare and Medicaid
programs had reached crisis proportions that cost $1 billion a year).
109. H.R. REP. No. 393, supra note 77, at 3047.
110. Act of Oct. 25, 1977, Pub. L. No. 95-142, § 1877(b), 91 Stat. 1175, 1180 (codified as
amended at 42 U.S.C. § 1320a-7b(b) (1988)) provides:
(b)(1) Whoever solicits or receives any remuneration (including any kickback, bribe,
or rebate) directly or indirectly, overtly or covertly, in cash or in kind-
(A) in return for referring an individual to a person for the furnishing
or arranging for the furnishing of any item or service for which payment
may be made in whole or in part under this title, or
(B) in return for purchasing, leasing, ordering, or arranging for or
recommending purchasing, leasing, or ordering any good, facility, service,
or item for which payment may be made in whole or in part under this title,
shall be guilty of a felony and upon conviction thereof, shall be fined not more than
$25,000 or imprisoned for not more than five years, or both.
(2) Whoever offers or pays any remuneration (including any kickback, bribe, or rebate)
directly or indirectly, overtly or covertly, in cash or in kind to any person to induce such
person-
(A) to refer an individual to a person for the furnishing or arranging
for the furnishing of any item or service for which payment may be made
in whole or in part under this title, or
(B) to purchase, lease, order or arrange for or recommend
purchasing, leasing, or ordering any good, facility, service, or item for
which payment may be made in whole or in part under this title,
shall be guilty of a felony and upon conviction thereof, shall be fined not more than
$25,000 or imprisoned for not more than five years, or both.
(3) Paragraphs (1) and (2) shall not apply to-
(A) a discount or other reduction in price obtained by a provider of
services or other entity under this title if the reduction in price is properly
disclosed and appropriately reflected in the costs claimed or charges made
by the provider or entity under this title; and
(B) any amount paid by an employer to an employee (who has a bona
fide employment relationship with such employer) for employment in the
provision of covered items or services.
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to exceed $25,000, or imprisonment for more than five years, or both."'
Also, the term 'kickback' was changed to 'any remuneration'." 2 The term
'any remuneration' broadened the reach of the statute to include more business
transactions. " 3 It encompassed kickbacks, bribes, and rebates, but specifically
excluded legitimate business payments, such as salaries to physicians for work
performed."14
In 1980, Congress amended the Anti-Fraud and Abuse Statute by changing
the strict liability standard to require that the abusive conduct be performed
"knowingly" and "willfully,"" 5 thus restricting the expansive reach that the
1977 "any remuneration" language had when coupled with the 1972 strict
liability standard." 6  In enacting the initial Anti-Fraud and Abuse Statute,
Congress intended to prosecute Medicare and Medicaid abuse. Yet, Congress
later hampered enforcement of that same statute.
2. The Medicare and Medicaid Patient and Program Protection Act
In 1987, Congress repealed sections 1395nn(b) and 1396h(b), and re-
111. Id. The 1972 penalties were inadequate deterrents and were inconsistent with existing
federal criminal code sanctions, which made similar actions punishable as a felony. H.R. REP. No.
393, supra note 77, at 3055-56.
112. The 'any remuneration' term was used to resolve the conflict among the courts in favor
of a broad meaning of the terms 'bribe' and 'kickback'. United States v. Zacher, 586 F.2d 912, 916
(2d Cir. 1978) (narrowly construing the term 'bribe' as "acts that are malum in se because they
entail either a breach of trust or duty or the corrupt selling of what our society deems not to be
legitimately for sale.... It is this element of corruption that distinguishes a bribe from a legitimate
payment for services"); United States v. Porter, 591 F.2d 1048, 1054 (5th Cir. 1979) (narrowly
construing the term 'kickback' as "involv[ing] a corrupt payment or receipt of payment in violation
of the duty imposed by Congress on providers of services to use federal funds only for intended
purposes and only in the approved manner"); United States v. Hancock, 604 F.2d 999, 1002 (7th
Cir. 1979) (broadly defining the term 'kickback' to be "a percentage payment for granting assistance
by one in a position to open up or control a source of income"), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 991 (1979);
United States v. Tapert, 625 F.2d 111, 121 (6th Cir. 1980) (affirming the Hancock court's definition
of kickback), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1034 (1980).
113. The term 'remuneration' is not specifically defined in the statute but is understood to
include any compensation or payment for a service, loss, or expense. The term is used in various
other federal statutes where considerable flexibility is needed to define payment arrangements. For
example, the Internal Revenue Code defines wages as remuneration in order to compute
unemployment and withholding taxes. Yoakum, supra note 104, at 693-94.
114. H.R. REP. No. 393, supra note 77, at 3050; see also McDowell Jr., supra note 27, at 92.
115. Act of Dec. 5, 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-499, 1980 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5526, 5572.
116. See Stephen C. Pierce, United States v. Greber and its Effect on the Medicare and
Medicaid Programs, 75 KY. L.J. 677, 691 (1986-87), for the view that Congress thought the strict
liability statute was "unjust" because criminal prosecution was possible for individuals whose
conduct, while improper, was inadvertent.
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enacted the provisions in altered form at section 1320a-7b." 7 The substantive
provisions for criminal sanctions were not materially changed.' However,
in addition to the criminal sanctions, the 1987 Act added a civil remedy to
117. 42 U.S.C. § 1320a-7b(b)(1) (1988). The text of § 1320a-7b(b)(l) provides:
(b) Illegal remunerations
(1) Whoever knowingly and willfully solicits or receives any remuneration
(including any kickback, bribe, or rebate) directly or indirectly, overtly or covertly, in
cash or in kind-
(A) in return for referring an individual to a person for the furnishing
or arranging for the furnishing of any item or service for which payment
may be made in whole or in part under subchapter XVII1 of this chapter or
a State health care program, or
(B) in return for purchasing, leasing, ordering, or arranging for or
recommending purchasing, leasing, or ordering any good, facility, service,
or item for which payment may be made in whole or in part under
subchapter XVIII of this chapter or a State health care program,
shall be guilty of a felony and upon conviction thereof, shall be fined not more than
$25,000 or imprisoned for not more than five years, or both.
(2) Whoever knowingly and willfully offers or pays any remuneration (including
any kickback, bribe, or rebate) directly or indirectly, overtly or covertly, in cash or in
kind to any person to induce such person-
(A) to refer an individual to a person for the furnishing or arranging
for the furnishing of any item or service for which payment may be made
in whole or in part under subchapter XVIH of this chapter or a State health
care program, or
(B) to purchase, lease, order, or arrange for or recommend
purchasing, leasing, or ordering any good, facility, service, or item for
which payment may be made in whole or in part under subchapter XVIII
of this chapter or a State health care program,
shall be guilty of a felony and upon conviction thereof, shall be fined not more than
$25,000 or imprisoned for not more than five years, or both.
(3) Paragraphs (1) and (2) shall not apply to-
(A) a discount or other reduction in price obtained by a provider of
services or other entity under subchapter XVm of this chapter or a State
health care program if the reduction in price is properly disclosed and
appropriately reflected in the costs claimed or charges made by the provider
or entity under subchapter XVIII of this chapter or a State health care
program;
(B) any amount paid by an employer to an employee (who has a bona
fide employment relationship with such employer) for employment in the
provision of covered items or services;
(C) any amount paid by a vendor of goods or services to a person
authorized to act as a purchasing agent for a group of individuals or entities
who are furnishing services reimbursed under subchapter XVIII of this
chapter or a State health care program...; and
(D) any payment practice specified by the Secretary in regulations
promulgated pursuant to section 14(a) of the Medicare and Medicaid Patient
and Program Protection Act of 1987.
118. The offense continues to be a felony, with fines not to exceed $25,000, or imprisonment
for not more than five years, or both. Id.
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exclude an individual or entity from participation in the Medicare and Medicaid
programs if the physician or health care entity engaged in a prohibited
remuneration scheme." 9 The Department of Health and Human Services
(HHS) has found it difficult to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that referral
arrangements are done knowingly and willfully.'O An additional advantage
of the civil action is that it can be brought more expediently before an
administrative law judge than before the crowded criminal courts.' 2' The
criminal sanction can ruin careers, whereas the civil sanction can financially
devastate physicians who receive much of their income from Medicare and
Medicaid.
Spawned by the 1982 Prospective Payment System (PPS) for hospitals,
many new business arrangements between physicians, hospitals, and other health
care entities were developed that may violate the any remuneration language in
the Act.'" The "any remuneration" language created uncertainty in the health
care industry as to which business arrangements are legitimate and which are
119. 42 U.S.C. § 1320a-7(b)(7) (1988). The OIG, which promulgated the civil remedy,
anticipates this will increase prosecutions in the future. The proof burden of the civil remedy is a
preponderance of the evidence. Fred Bayles, IllegalDoctor-Hospital Relationship Hard To Prove,
THE INDIANAPOLIS STAR, Oct. 22, 1990.
120. Mr. Thomas Crane, an attorney with Health & Human Services (HHS), remarked,
"Proving the intent of the parties is sometimes very complicated.... There are well-paid lawyers
who help hide the intent of the parties." Fred Bayles, Illegal Doctor-Hospital Relationship Hard
To Prove, THE INDIANAPOLIS STAR, Oct. 22, 1990. After criminal prosecution, HHS excluded only
335 physiciansbetween 1977 and 1982. S. REP. No. 109, 100th Cong., 1st Sess., reprinted in 1987
U.S.C.C.A.N. 682, 684.
121. The Justice Department lacked sufficient resources to train anti-fraud auditors,
investigators, and attorneys. Pies, supra note 55, at 327. Appeals are heard within the Department
of Health and Human services by the Departmental Grant Appeals Board. Judicial review is
available in federal district courts but is subject to the Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 706
(1988).
122. Many hospitals and physicians formed joint ventures to provide outpatient health care
facilities in the community, which may be a more economical form of health care. Joint Ventures
in Health Care: More than a Sideline Business, HEALTWCARE FIN. MGMT., May 1986, at 68.
Some hospitals carved out a profitable hospital department, such as cardiac nuclear medicine, to
form a joint venture with physicians. The hospitals argued that the increased use of the department's
services, now owned by physicians, reduced the unit cost of the service for each patient, and thus
was a more economical form of health care. David Burda, IRS to Joint Ventures: The Party's
Over- Hospital/Physician Link Likely to put Tax Status in Jeopardy, MOD. HEALTHCARE, Dec. 9,
1991, at 2, 14. The hospital, in an attempt to provide a more economical service, seems to have
violated the Anti-Fraud and Abuse Statutes. It is hard to argue that the increase in use of these
services after physician ownership is attributable to medical necessity upon which Medicare and
Medicaid bills are filed. Joint Ventures Imperil Hospitals' Tax Status, 75 Federal Tax Guide Reports
(CCH), Report No. 13 (Dec. 27, 1991).
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illegal. " In response, the Act also directed the Secretary of Health and
Human Services (HHS) to promulgate regulations specifying payment practices
that shall not be treated as a basis for exclusion or criminal prosecution.'
3. The Safe Harbors
On July 29, 1991, HHS issued eleven safe harbors. These rules
protect various payment practices and business arrangements from criminal
prosecution and civil sanctions under the Medicare and Medicaid Patient and
Program Protection Act." The safe harbor rules applicable to physician self-
referral arrangements include investment interest,127 space rental, "
123. S. REP. No. 109, supra note 120, at 707. The report reiterated the position taken when
passing the 1977 Statute that the term 'any remuneration' was not to include legitimate business
payments, such as employment salaries. McDowell Jr., supra note 27, at 92. However, the 1977
Statute does not address investments and contractual arrangements.
124. 42 U.S.C. § 1320a-7(b)(3)(D) (1988).
125. HHS initially proposed regulations on December 23, 1988. 53 Fed. Reg. 51,856 (1988).
Five days later, the HHS withdrew the regulations due to pressure from the Department of Justice
and the Office of Management and Budget. 53 Fed. Reg. 52,448 (1988). New proposed regulations
were published for comment on January 23, 1989. 54 Fed. Reg. 3088 (1989). Final safe harbor
rules were published two years after the statutory due date on July 29, 1991. 56 Fed. Reg. 35,952
(1991).
126. Gary W. Eiland, Final Safe Harbors Narrow and Rarely Navigable, HEALTHCARE FIN.
MGMT., Oct. 1991, at 15; Final Safe Harbor Rules Published, HEALTHCARE FIN. MGMT., Sept.
1991, at 5.
127. 42 C.F.R. § 1001.952(a) (1992).
128. 42 C.F.R. § 1001.952(b) (1992). The regulation provides:
(b) Space Rental. As used in section 1 128B of the Act, "remuneration" does not
include any payment made by a lessee to a lessor for the use of premises, as long as all
of the following five standards are met-
(1) The lease agreement is set out in writing and signed by the parties.
(2) The lease specifies the premises covered by the lease.
(3) If the lease is intended to provide the lessee with access to the
premises for periodic intervals of time, rather than on a full-time basis for
the term of the lease, the lease specifies exactly the schedule of such
intervals, their precise length, and the exact rent for such intervals.
(4) The term of the lease is for not less than one year.
(5) The aggregate rental charge is set in advance, is consistent with
fair market value in arms-length transactions and is not determined in a
manner that takes into account the volume or value of any referrals or
business otherwise generated between the parties for which payment may
be made in whole or in part under Medicare or a State health care program.
For purposes of paragraph (b) of this section, the term fair market value means the value of
the rental property for general commercial purposes, but shall not be adjusted to reflect the
additional value that one party (either the prospective lessee or lessor) would attribute to the property
as a result of its proximity or convenience to sources of referrals or business otherwise generated
for which payment may be made in whole or in part under Medicare or a State health care program.
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equipment rental,"2  personal services, and management contracts.' 30 The
safe harbors allow physician investments and financial interests in the listed
entities, but the safe harbors do not provide for disclosure of a physician's
investment and financial interest to the patient. 
13
The safe harbor protects physician investments in large health care
entities-such as those registered with the Securities and Exchange
Commission-or entities that have at least $50 million in undepreciated net
tangible health care assets from the Anti-Fraud and Abuse Statute.'32 The
Office of the Inspector General (OIG) notes that payments from large entities to
physicians could only be remotely attributable to referrals.'33 Therefore, the
connection between the payments and the referrals is weak."
The safe harbor also protects physicians who invest in a small health care
entity, such as a limited partnership,' 35 if no more than forty percent of the
entity is controlled by physicians or other investors who are in a position to
control the flow of business to the entity." The OIG is of the opinion that
physicians who control more than forty percent of an entity will not have to
compete for business in the open market on the basis of cost, quality, and
convenience. 37  The health care entity supported by a physician investor base
129. The equipment rental safe harbor is substantively similar to the space rental safe harbor.
42 C.F.R. § 1001.952(c) (1992).
130. The personal services and management contracts safe harbor is substantively similar to the
space rental safe harbor. 42 C.F.R. § 1001.952(d) (1992).
131. 56 Fed. Reg. 35,969 (1991).
132. 42 C.F.R. § 1001.952(a) (1992).
133. 56 Fed. Reg. 35,964-66 (1991). The more referrals the facility receives, the greater the
facility's total profit, which increases the physician's return on investment. However, in a large
health care facility, the referrals of any one physician will have less effect on that physician's return
on investment. Therefore, the physician's incentive to make unnecessary referrals is diminished.
Kimberly A. King, Note, Regulating Physician Investment and Referral Behavior in the Competitive
Health Care Marketplace of the '90s-An Argument for Decentralization, 65 WASH. L. REV. 657,
672 (1990).
134. King, supra note 133, at 672.
135. 42 C.F.R. § 1001.952(a) (1992). Physician equity interests in limited partnerships are the
most controversial. The Ethics in Patient Referrals Act of 1989, supra note 17.
136. 42 C.F.R. § 1001.952(a) (1992). But see Eiland, supra note 126, at 16 (stating that the
60/40 Rule will not include the typical physician joint venture. Most physician joint ventures have
a much higher ratio of physician ownership.); Millenson, supra note 86, at C2 (citing Representative
Stark, the chairman of the House subcommittee that oversees Medicare, who commented that the
60/40 Rule was nothing more than a loophole.).
137. 56 Fed. Reg. 35,966 (1991) (stating that the 60/40 Rule minimizes the corrupting influence
the investment interest has on the physician's referral behavior.). But see 56 Fed. Reg. 35,969
(1991). Many commentators believe that physician joint ventures have no real business purpose and
that the 60/40 Rule will not prevent abuse. See also King, supra note 133, at 672 (the more
referrals the facility receives, the greater the facility's total profit, which increases the physicians's
return on investment).
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in excess of forty percent will have captive referrals."' s The guidelines also
specifically provide that payments-such as dividends-must be commensurate
with the physician's investment and risk, to assure that payments do not~fluctuate
according to the amount of referrals.'39  The safe harbor rules allow
physicians the freedom to invest in ventures within their expertise, which often
benefit the public by providing access to medical services that would otherwise
be unavailable."0
Space rental, equipment rental, and personal services and management
contracts 4 ' are safe harbors, provided that there is a written contract for a
term of at least one year that is based on the fair market value of the
services. 4 z These safe harbor provisions require that payments be consistent
with fair market value. The regulations explicitly provide that safe harbor
protection is not available where any part of the payments take into account the
volume or value of referrals generated by the physician."4  Frequently,
payment for referrals is made by offering such items as medical equipment,
business equipment, office space, and personnel services such as accountants,
secretaries, and nurses either at a substantial savings or completely free of
charge.'"
138. See supra note 137.
139. Investments that base the rate of return on the volume of referrals provide a strong
financial incentive for physicians to abuse their referral privilege. King, supra note 133, at 672.
The physician's business decision to invest should be separated from the physician's referral
decision, which is to be based on medical necessity. McDowell Jr., supra note 27, at 104.
140. David Burda, States Lag in Regulating Self Referrals, MOD. HEALTHCARE, Dec. 23/30,
1991, at 40 (noting that Jennifer Christian, M.D., president of the Alaska State Medical Association,
commented that in frontier areas the physician's entrepreneurial activity established the medical
infrastructure); King, supra note 133, at 669 (noting that local physicians pool their funds to provide
the needed health care service, such as dialysis, in rural communities that do not attract corporate
investors); McDowell Jr., supra note 27, at 71 (noting that the physician's investment interest
creates an economic interest in the facility to provide a quality service). But see Letters to the
Editor, supra note 20, at 252 (There is plenty of venture capital to start new health care entities.
Hospitals and private corporations do not need physicians' capital. Physicians are given a financial
stake in the enterprise to ensure their referrals.).
141. These three safe harbors are to protect legitimate compensation arrangements. The
requirements for all three are the same. 56 Fed. Reg. 35,953 (1991).
142. The fair market value criteria was preceded by the Lipkis case. In Lipkis, the court
emphasized the importance of determining the fair market value when assessing the legitimacy of
payments made to physicians in a position to make referrals. The fair market value of the services
was substantially less than the payment, therefore the excess payment amount must be for referrals.
United States v. Lipkis, 770 F.2d 1447 (9th Cir. 1985).
143. 42 C.F.R. § 1001.952(b-d) (1992).
144. E.g., Tanquilut v. Illinois Dep't of Public Aid, 396 N.E.2d 1126 (Ill. 1979). A
pharmacist leased pharmacy space from a physician where the lease provided an incentive rent in
addition to a base rent. The incentive rent was based on the pharmacist's sales; therefore the greater
the amount of physician referrals to the pharmacist, the greater the incentive rent the pharmacist paid
to the physician. Id.; see also United States v. Universal Trade and Indus. Inc., 695 F.2d 1151 (9th
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The safe harbors allow physician investment and compensation
arrangements, which may create entities that provide less costly health care by
attempting to distinguish the legitimate business payment from the illegal referral
payment." But, even the preamble of the rules. notes that a safe harbor may
not be all that safe. The OIG states that it "intend[s] to monitor business
arrangements that comply with the terms of these safe harbor provisions,
particularly investment interests, to determine whether abusive arrangements
exist within the parameter of a particular safe harbor."'" The preamble
indicates how difficult it is to separate legitimate business arrangements from
program abuse. 47  Indeed, it may be impossible to statutorily define a
legitimate business arrangement from a fraudulent practice. " Clever lawyers
can almost always structure business arrangements so that the arrangement
complies with any set of rules, no matter how strictly they are written.
4. Judicial Interpretation of the Anti-Fraud and Abuse Statutes
In United States v. Greber,'49 the defendant physician formed the
company Cardio-Med to provide physicians with diagnostic services, such as
analysis of readings from a Holter-monitor. Cardio-Med billed Medicare for the
Holter-monitor service and, when payment was received, advanced a portion to
the referring physician."s Cardio-Med characterized the payment as an
"interpretation fee," and, indeed, many of the referring physicians did perform
interpretive work.' The fee was more than the Medicare allowance for such
services and was paid even when the defendant interpreted the data. 52
The Greber court stated that the 1977 statute was aimed at the inducement
factor, regardless of whether payments were also intended to compensate for
professional services in connection with the tests." 3 The court held "that if
one purpose of the payment was to induce future referrals, the Medicare statute
Cir. 1983).
145. Physician ownership does not per se violate the Anti-Fraud and Abuse Statute. McDowell
Jr., supra note 27, at 96.
146. 56 Fed. Reg. 35,958 (1991).
147. Id.
148. The health care system is in a transitional phase-no set of guidelines could keep up with
the new business entities that are developing. McDowell, supra note 8, at 753. A major difficulty
in statutorily defining fraud and abuse stems from the ambiguities inherent in these terms. These
terms are vague and, to the extent they are vague, they do not sufficiently protect the patient. Pies,
supra note 55, at 325.
149. United States v. Greber, 760 F.2d 68, 70 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 988 (1985).
150. Id.
151. Id.
152. Id.
153. Id. at 71.
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has been violated."s 4  Other courts as well have interpreted the 'any
remuneration' term of the 1977 statute broadly. 55
In Inspector General v. Hanlester Network," the defendant promoters
established three joint venture limited partnership laboratories, which sought
approximately thirty-five licensed physicians-the number capable of supporting
the laboratories by referrals-as investors for each laboratory.1 7  The
defendant promoters made it clear to the physicians that failure to refer
laboratory tests would lead to investment failure.' A sales representative for
the promoters further told potential physician investors that the percent of
investment offered depended upon expected referrals and that the ownership
interest was contingent upon the continuation of referrals. 
59
The Administrative Law Judge (ALJ), in a lengthy opinion, held that to
violate the "to induce" language of the Act, there must be an agreement to refer
business."'° The Act does not prohibit offers or payments that are calculated
to encourage physicians to refer business but do not require referrals as a
condition for payment.'' The ALJ further reasoned that the physicians did
154. Id. at 69. The phrase is most often quoted by the HHS as an accurate interpretation of
the term 'any remuneration'. OIG REPORT, supra note 1, at 19,928.
155. United States v. Kats, 871 F.2d 105 (9th Cir. 1989). The owner of Tech-Lab agreed to
kick back 50% of the Medicare payments received by Tech-Lab as a result of referrals from Total
Health Care. The Ninth Circuit quoted approvingly from United States v. Greber in upholding the
trial judge's charge to the jury. See also United States v. Bay State Ambulance and Hosp. Rental
Serv. Inc., 874 F.2d 20 (1st Cir. 1989). Bay State paid Mr. Felici, an official at Quincy City
Hospital, $9610 and gave him two cars to recommend that the hospital enter into an exclusive
contract with Bay State for ambulance services. Bay State received payments from Medicare. The
First Circuit upheld the convictions of Bay State and Mr. Felici, even though Mr. Felici did some
computer programming for Bay State, based on the Greber court's definition of remuneration.
156. The InspectorGen. v. Hanlester Network, HHS Departmental Appeals Bd. Civil Remedies
Div., Docket Nos. C-186 through C-192, C-208 & C-213, reprinted in [1991 Transfer Binder]
Medicare & Medicaid Guide (CCH) 39,094, at 25,509 (Mar. 1, 1991). The Hanlester case is the
first time the Inspector General attempted to exclude a provider from the Medicare and Medicaid
programs. David Burda, HHS Adopts Tough Kickback Definition, MOD. HEALTHCARE, Sept. 23,
1991, at 2.
157. The Inspector Gen. v. Hanlester Network, HHS Departmental Appeals Bd. Civil Remedies
Div., Docket Nos. C-186 through C-192, C-208 & C-213, reprinted in [1991 Transfer Binder]
Medicare & Medicaid Guide (CCH) 1 39,094, at 25,513 (Mar. 1, 1991).
158. Id. at 25,513-14. Prospectuses on limited partnership offerings to physicians generally
do not state that referrals are required, which would violate the law, but indicate the expectation that
the physician will refer to the entity. Nonphysicians are discriminated against in the formation of
these limited partnerships. OIG REPORT, supra note 1, at 19,933.
159. The InspectorGen. v. Hanlester Network, HHS Departmental Appeals Bd. Civil Remedies
Div., Docket Nos. C-186 through C-192, C-208 & C-213, reprinted in [1991 Transfer Binder]
Medicare & Medicaid Guide (CCH) 39,094, at 25,516 (Mar. 1, 1991).
160. Id. at 25,544.
161. Id. at 25,540-42.
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not receive "remuneration" because the physicians' investments entailed risk,
and the distributions from the laboratory to the physicians were based on the
physicians' equitable ownership interest-not on the basis of referrals. 62 The
ALJ concluded that "the law does not attach liability to parties simply because
they benefit from contracts."" 6
On appeal, the Departmental Appeals Board"6  held that the Act
contemplates payments made with the intent of exercising influence over a
physician's reason or judgment, in an effort to cause the referral of Medicare
and Medicaid business."6  The Departmental Appeals Board reasoned that
nothing in the statutory language, legislative history, or case law explicitly or
implicitly requires an agreement.166  The statute focuses on the substance
rather than the form of any transaction or relationship in analyzing the flow of
cash between entities and physicians. 67 Therefore, the absence of any explicit
agreement guaranteeing referrals does not mean that referrals are any less in
return for remuneration if there is an intentional connection between the referral
and the payment." s  The Board remanded the case to the AU for further
action." The AUD found all the defendants guilty, but curiously excluded
only the laboratories-which had not been in operation for two years-from the
Medicare program. No physicians were punished."7
The Hanlester decision arguably expands the Greber definition of illegal
referrals. 7' The tenor of the Hanlester decision is reminiscent of Nathaniel
R. Jones' concurring opinion in United States v. Tapert.' 2 In Tapert, Judge
Jones stated,
162. Id. at 25,545.
163. Id. at 25,510.
164. The Inspector Gen. v. Hanlester Network, HHS Departmental Appeals Ed. Appellate Div.,
Docket No. 1275, reprinted in [1992-1 Transfer Binder] Medicare & Medicaid Guide (CCH)
39,566, at 27,739 (Sept. 18, 1991).
165. Id. at 27,762.
166. Id. at 27,748-56.
167. Id. at 27,749. Representative Rostenkowski, the sponsor of the 1977 Anti-Fraud and
Abuse Statute, remarked that the Statute's remuneration term was needed because "[w]e are in a
complex area where right and wrong are often clouded with shades of grey. In such situations, the
committee stresses the need to recognize that the substance rather than simply the form of a
transaction should be controlling." Yoakum, supra note 104, at 695.
168. The Inspector Gen. v. Hanlester Network, HHS Departmental Appeals Bd. Appellate Div.,
Docket No. 1275, reprinted in [1992-1 Transfer Binder] Medicare & Medicaid Guide (CCH) I
39,566, at 27,748 (Sept. 18, 1991).
169. Id. at 27,740.
170. David Burda, Three Physician-Owned Labs, Officers Found Guilty in Medicare Kickback
Case, MOD. HEALTHCARE, March 16, 1992, at 2.
171. David Burda, supra note 122.
172. United States v. Tapert, 625 F.2d 111 (6th Cir.) (Jones, J., concurring), cert. denied, 449
U.S. 1034 (1980).
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The statute is satisfied if there is a logical relationship between the
kickbacks and the services for which federal funds were paid....
The relationship between the physicians and the laboratory was formed
around their payment of the kickbacks. The physicians chose to refer
patients to a specific laboratory because of the negotiated kickback
payments. 173
The Hanlester court seems merely to require a connection between the payments
and referrals, 174 whereas the Greber court placed emphasis on whether the
business arrangement was calculated to induce referrals. 175 The difference
may be due to semantics; nonetheless, the Act is expansively interpreted to
encompass a wide variety of health care business arrangements.
However, the expansive interpretation of the 'any remuneration' term of the
Act has not chilled new business arrangements. 176 New business arrangements
are part of the changing industry's effort to find more cost efficient ways of
providing health care. " The momentum of the Prospective Payment System
(PPS) has naturally encouraged competitive business associations in spite of the
fact that the arrangements may violate the Anti-Fraud and Abuse Statute.
Indeed, the momentum of the PPS led to the safe harbors that allow certain
physician financial and investment interests."7
The Hanlester and the Greber cases also exemplify the difficulty in
prosecuting these activities. Physicians can contract and enter into business
arrangements like all other citizens. 79 It is difficult for juries-as it was for
the Administrative Law Judge in Hanlester-to distinguish legitimate business
practices from program abuse."m Referral payments are often commingled
with other payments to the physician for legitimate purposes.'8 ' Moreover,
173. Id. at 122-23.
174. See supra note 168 and accompanying text.
175. See supra note 153 and accompanying text.
176. The number of physician-owned Magnetic Resonance Imaging (MR) centers in Illinois
has increased dramatically in recent months according to state records. Illinois granted 22 MRI
permits within the last 12 months, compared with 50 permits in the previous five years. Within the
last six months, three MRI centers opened within a mile of each other in downtown Chicago. The
MRI centers cost at least $2 million each. Millenson, supra note 86, at C2.
177. See supra notes 64-73 and accompanying text.
178. See supra notes 123-48 and accompanying text.
179. U.S. CONST. amend. V; U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
180. See supra notes 156-70 and accompanying text.
181. United States v. Greber, 760 F.2d 68 (3d Cir. 1985) (characterizing payment as
"interpretation fees"); United States v. Universal Trade and Indus. Inc., 695 F.2d 1151 (9th Cir.
1983) (characterizing payment as "administrative fees"); United States v. Hancock, 604 F.2d 999
(7th Cir. 1979) (characterizing payment as "handling fees").
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each business arrangement is structured differently." s Although the safe
harbors provide some guidelines, they also admit their defeat in the preamble as
to statutorily created criteria." 3 Few physicians have been prosecuted and
little case law exists. S"
In sum, the statutory language is broad, the judicial interpretation is
expansive, and the penalties for violating the statute are strong."u Yet, the
cost containment measures that encourage physician ownership in new health
care entities seem to be stronger. 8 6 The physician's ownership and financial
interests in other health care entities seem to be increasing.'87  Further,
definitional problems inherent in the fraud and abuse terms hamper enforcement
of the statutes."s  Thus, a Physician Conflict of Interest Disclosure Law is
necessary to protect the patient from abusive practices by facilitating patient
autonomy.
C. The Antitrust Laws Applied to the American Medical Association's
Guidelines On Physician Self-Referral Arrangements
The American Medical Association (AMA) has continually addressed the
issue of physician self-referral arrangements throughout the 1980s and
1990s. "9 Succinctly stated, the dilemma facing the AMA is whether the
physicians' fiduciary commitment to patients should be strengthened by banning
182. Because many of these arrangements are structured differently, investigationsare complex,
labor-intensive, and difficult to explain to a fact-finder. OIG REPORT, supra note 1, at 19,935.
183. See supra notes 145-48 and accompanying text.
184. McDowell, supra note 8, at 753 (noting that the fraud provisions have been used
sparingly); Letters to the Editor, supra note 20, at 251 (noting that the statutes are relatively new
in terms of building a body of case law); Yoakum, supra note 104, at 685 (noting that few cases
have been prosecuted).
185. See supra notes 111-21, 149-75 and accompanying text.
186. See supra notes 176-78 and accompanying text.
187. See supra notes 176-78 and accompanying text.
188. See supra notes 179-84 and accompanying text.
189. The AMA reminded physicians that medicine is a profession, a calling, and not a business.
HOUSE OF DELEoATES OF THE AMA, COMMERCIALISM IN THE PRACTICE OF MEDICINE: REPORT
OF THE BOARD OF TRUSTEES OF THE AMA, June 1983. In December 1991, at its interim annual
meeting, the AMA approved new self-referral guidelines, which provide that physicians should not
refer patients to entities in which the physician has an investment or financial interest unless there
is a need in the community for the medical facility and there is no alternative financing available.
David Burda, AMA Toughens Guidelines on Physician Self-Referrals, MOD. HEALTHCARE, Dec. 16,
1991, at 4. In May 1992, the AMA requested physicians to divest themselves of self-referral
arrangements by January 1995. The guidelines apparently were not endorsed by many physicians.
In June 1992, the AMA retracted the six-month-old guidelines. Currently, the AMA provides that
referrals by a physician to a facility in which the physician has a financial interest are ethical as long
as patients are informed of the ownership arrangement and of alternative sources of care. David
Burda, Self-Referral Issue Targeted on Two Fronts, MOD. HEALTHCARE, June 29, 1992, at 3.
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or limiting physician ownership in other health care entities, or whether
entrepreneurialism and commercial competition should be encouraged."'g The
Federal Trade Commission (FTC) resolved the dilemma when it stated that the
AMA cannot prevent physicians from investing and forming contractual
relationships with other health care entities to which they refer patients. The
antitrust laws do not permit professional organizations to restrain trade by
preventing their members from investing and contracting, even when their
purposes are noble.""1
Prior to 1975, physicians doubted that economic competition had any role
in the delivery of health care. At that time, physicians felt no pressure to offer
patients services that the patients might want. For example, physicians rarely
offered Saturday and evening office hours. In fact, health care was generally
either provided in a hospital or a physician's office. Now, health care can be
obtained in a variety of settings dealing with specialized problems. For
instance, outpatient physical therapy centers and outpatient surgical centers serve
as alternatives to hospitals. By preserving competition, the antitrust laws have
fostered innovative health care entities that more readily meet the needs of
patients. 192
Although the AMA cannot devise an ethical rule that prohibits physicians
from having an ownership interest in a facility to which they refer patients, '13
an ethical rule that merely requires physicians to disclose their equity interests
in health care facilities when they refer patients would probably not raise
antitrust questions. The FTC does not prohibit the AMA from adopting an
ethics standard designed to protect the public, as long as the ethics standard is
not anticompetitive. " Thus, the AMA allows physicians to refer their
190. Arnold S. Relman, Antitrust Law and the Physician Entrepreneur, 313 NEW ENO. J. MED.
884, 885 (1985).
191. In re American Medical Ass'n, 94F.T.C. 701, 1016, 1037-38 (1979), aff'd as modified,
638 F.2d 443 (2d Cir. 1980), aff'd by an equally divided Court, FTC v. AMA, 455 U.S. 676
(1982). The AMA engaged in unfair trade practices by directing its members not to enter into a
contract with terms that are inconsistent with the AMA's medical ethics. The AMA's preservation
of fee-for-service compensation, as opposed to income sharing arrangements between physicians and
nonphysicians, was found by the Court to impede the development of innovative forms of health care
delivery. Id.; but see Nat'l Soc. of Professional Engineers v. United States, 435 U.S. 679 (1978).
The "limited professional exemption" may entitle the AMA to application of the "rule of reason,"
which may allow the AMA to restrain trade if the professional justifications are sufficiently
compelling.
192. L. Barry Costilo, Antitrust Enforcement in Health Care: Ten Years After the AMA Suit,
313 NEw ENG. J. MED. 901, 901 (1985).
193. A rule prohibiting physicians from having an ownership interest in a facility to which they
refer patients is too broad a restriction on competition. Id. at 904.
194. Arnold S. Relman, Antitrust Law and the Physician Entrepreneur, 313 NEW ENG. J. MED.
884, 884 (1985).
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patients to entities in which they have ownership or financial interests, as long
as the interests are disclosed to the patient. 95 The AMA disclosure guideline,
however, is only a guideline and does not have any legal force."
IV. A PROPOSAL FOR A PHYSICIAN CONFLICT OF INTEREST
DISCLOSURE LAW
In sum, the laws banning physician self-referrals contain multiple
exceptions, present constitutional concerns, and-most importantly-may
adversely affect innovative health care entities. The Anti-Fraud and Abuse
Statutes are difficult to enforce because of the definitional problems inherent in
the fraud and abuse terms and the current health care business climate. Finally,
the AMA has a disclosure guideline but cannot legally enforce it. This Note's
purpose is to provide a model disclosure law that the federal government should
enact in light of the proliferation of business arrangements between physicians
and other health care entities.
A. The States' Regulation of Physician Self-Referral Arrangements
States have chosen different regulatory responses to physician self-referral
arrangements. For instance, many states have laws substantively similar to the
federal government's Anti-Fraud and Abuse Statute."9 These laws enable the
195. One AMA opinion provides:
A physician may own or have a financial interest in a for-profit hospital, nursing
home or other health facility, such as a freestanding surgical center or emergency clinic.
However, the physician has an affirmative ethical obligation to disclose his ownership
of a health facility to his patient, prior to admission or utilization.
Under no circumstances may the physician place his own financial interest above
the welfare of his patients. The prime objective of the medical profession is to render
service to humanity; reward or financial gain is a subordinate consideration. For a
physician to unnecessarily hospitalize a patient or prolong a patient's stay in the health
facility for the physician's financial benefit would be unethical.
If a conflict develops between the physician's financial interest and the physician's
responsibilities to the patient, the conflict must be resolved to the patient's benefit.
AMA, Current Opinion of the Council on Ethical and Judicial Affairs, Section 8.07 (1989).
196. The AMA is an educational and political lobbying organization that represents less than
half of the physicians in the United States. David Burda, Self-Referral Issue Targeted on Two
Fronts, MOD. HEALTHCARE, June 29, 1992, at 3. The AMA's membership is dwindling and its
power decreasing. STARR, supra note 9, at 427. Physicians that refer patients to entities they own
have not rushed to divest their holdings or to disclose the potential conflict to patients. Millenson,
supra note 86, at C2.
197. ALA. CODE § 22-1-11 (1990); ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-55-103 (Michie 1987); CAL. WELF.
& INST. CODE § 14107.2 (West 1991); COLO. REV. STAT. § 26-1-127 (1989); CONN. GEN. STAT.
ANN. 17-134a (West 1992); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 409.2664 (West 1986); HAW. REV. STAT. §
346.43.5 (1985); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 194.505 (Baldwin 1991); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §
14:70:1 (West Supp. 1991); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 118E, § 21A-E (West Supp. 1992); MICH.
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respective state's attorney general to prosecute on behalf of Medicaid and other
state health care programs." Another minority of states require physicians
to disclose ownership interests to the referred patients."9
States differ greatly regarding disclosure requirements. For example,
Pennsylvania requires any financial interest in the health .care entity to be
disclosed, whereas Florida requires disclosure if the equity interest is ten percent
or more.mo Many states require written disclosure, but some states deem a
conspicuously located sign as adequate disclosure."' Generally, the states
leave it to the state medical board to promulgate the form of disclosure;
however, New Jersey statutorily prescribes the form.' Typically, most states
COMP. LAWS ANN. § 400.60 (West 1988); MISS. CODE ANN. § 43-13-207 (Supp. 1992); N.C. GEN.
STAT. § 108A-63 (1992); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2913.40 (Baldwin 1990); R.I. GEN. LAWS §
40-8.2-3 (1990); UTAH CODE ANN. § 26-20-4 (1989); VA. CODE ANN. § 32.1-315 (Michie 1992);
WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 74.09.210.(West Supp. 1992); W. VA. CODE § 9-7-5 (1990); WiS.
STAT. ANN. § 49.49(2) (West 1987).
198. The Department of Justice in a criminal case or the OIG in a civil case are the only ones
who can prosecute under the Medicare and Medicaid Program and Protection Act. OIG REPORT,
supra note 1, at 19,937. Congress did not provide a private remedy to health care providers who
may be injured as a result of a competitor's noncompliance with the Anti-Fraud and Abuse Statute.
The plaintiff, West Allis Memorial Hospital, did not have standing. West Allis Memorial Hosp. Inc.
v. Bowen, 852 F.2d 251, 255 (7th Cir. 1988).
199. ARIz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 32-1401(21)(ff) (Supp. 1992); CAL. Bus & PROF. CODE §§
654.1,654.2 (West 1990); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 458.33 1(gg) (West 1991); MD. HEALTH OCC. CODE
ANN. § 1-206 (Supp. 1992); MASs. GEN. LAws ANN. ch. 112 § I (West 1989); MASS. GEN. LAWS
ANN. ch. 440, § 2 (West 1989); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 147.091(p)(3),(4) (West 1989); NEV. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 630-305 (Michie 1992); N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 45:9-22.4-45:9-22.8(West 1991); PA.
STAT. ANN. tit. 35 § 449.22 (Supp. 1992); R.I. GEN. LAws § 5-37-22(e) (Supp. 1992); TENN.
CODE ANN. §§ 63-6-501-63-6-503 (Supp. 1992); VA. CODE ANN. § 54.1-2964 (Michie 1991);
WASH. REv. CODE ANN. § 19.68.010 (West 1989); W. VA. CODE § 30-3-14(c)(6),(7) (Supp. 1992).
Some states, such as Arizona, Maryland, Minnesota, Pennsylvania, and Tennessee, rely solely upon
their disclosure statutes and have no Anti-Fraud and Abuse Statute equivalents.
200. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 35 § 449.22 (Supp. 1992); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 458.33 1(gg) (West
1991). But see CAL. Bus & PROF. CODE §§ 654.1, 654.2 (West 1990). The California statute
requires disclosure to be made if the physician's equity interest is five percent. Id.
201. The disclosure requirements may be met by posting a conspicuous disclosure statement
at a single location, such as a common area or registration area, or by providing those patients with
a written disclosure statement. CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE §§ 654.1, 654.2 (West 1990).
202. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 45:9-22.6 (West 1991). The written disclosure form required pursuant
to section 2 of this act shall be in the following form:
Public law of the State of New Jersey mandates that a physician, chiropractor or
podiatrist inform his patients of any significant financial interest he may have in a health
care service.
Accordingly, I wish to inform you that I do have a financial interest in the
following health care service(s) to which I refer my patients:
(list applicable health care services)
You may, of course, seek treatment at a health care service provider of your own
choice. A listing of alternative health care service providers can be found in the
classified section of your telephone directory under the appropriate heading.
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deem a violation of the disclosure statute as grounds for disciplinary action, but
Washington considers the offense a misdemeanor. °3
As an example of state requirements, the Rhode Island disclosure statute
provides:
Every physician who has an ownership interest in health facilities,
or laboratories or any equipment not on the physician's premises shall,
in writing, make full patient disclosure of his or her ownership interest
in the facility or therapy prior to utilization. The written notice shall
state that the patient has free choice either to use the physician's
proprietary facility or therapy or may seek the needed medical services
elsewhere.'a
Similarly, Pennsylvania's disclosure of interest in referral facilities statute
provides:
Any practitioner of the healing arts shall, prior to referral of a
patient to any facility or entity engaged in providing health-related
services, tests, pharmaceuticals, appliances or devices, disclose to the
patient any financial interest of the practitioner or ownership by the
practitioner in the facility or entity. In making any referral, the
practitioner of the healing arts may render any recommendations he
considers appropriate, but shall advise the patient of his freedom of
choice in the selection of a facility or entity. A person who violates
this section shall be liable to the Commonwealth for a civil penalty not
to exceed $1,000. The licensing boards in the bureau shall enforce
this section.'
Most states do not require disclosure.") The states that do have
disclosure laws often use vague language unnecessarily leaving much to be
interpreted by the courts.' Thus, no one state has a disclosure law that the
federal government could adopt. This Note proposes the following Model
Physician Conflict of Interest Disclosure Law, which uses the best attributes of
the current state disclosure laws.
203. WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 19.68.010 (West 1989). However, see PA. STAT. ANN. tit.
35 § 449.22 (Supp. 1992) for a State that makes violators liable to the Commonwealth for a civil
penalty not to exceed $1,000.
204. R.I. GEN. LAWS § 5-37-22(e) (Supp. 1992).
205. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 35 § 449.22 (Supp. 1992).
206. Thirty-six states do not require disclosure.
207. E.g., R.I. GEN. LAWS § 5-37-22(e) (Supp. 1992); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 35 § 44.22 (Supp.
1992).
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B. Model Physician Conflict of Interest Disclosure Law
(A) It is unlawful for any physician who receives payment from
Medicare or Medicaid on behalf of the patient to refer the patient to
a health care entity that the physician, the physician's employer,"
or the physician's immediate family has a significant beneficial interest
in, unless the physician first discloses the interest to the patient.
(B) The disclosure should be in writing, in bold print,'
advising the patient of the physicians' interest, and that the patient may
choose another health care entity to obtain the services and items
requested by the physician."' The disclosure should be dated and
signed by the patient, acknowledging that the patient has read and
understands that the physician has a financial interest in the entity to
which the patient is referred.2 '
(C) For the purposes of this law the following terms apply:
(1) "Significant beneficial interest "212 means any
financial interest that is greater than the lesser of the
following:
(a) Two percent of the whole
(b) Five thousand dollars ($5,000)
(2) "Immediate family"213 includes the physician's
spouse, children, parents, siblings, childrens' spouses,
parents' spouses, and siblings' spouses.
208. Florida was the only state that required disclosure if the patient was referred by a
physician employee whose employer has a significant financial interest in the health care entity
referred. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 458.331(gg) (West 1991).
209. The state of Virginia is the only state that requires the written disclosure to be conspicuous
for the purpose of catching the patient's attention. VA. CODE ANN. § 54.1-2964 (Michie 1991).
210. The provision of notifying the patient of their choice is common to all the states'
disclosure laws.
211. Arizona is the only state that requires the patient to acknowledge that the patient has read
the disclosure. ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 32-1401(21)(fl) (Supp. 1992).
212. This section was essentially derived from the Maryland disclosure law. MD. HEALTH
OCC. CODE ANN. § 1-206(a)(6) (Supp. 1991).
213. This section is essentially derived from the California disclosure law. CAL. Bus. & PROF.
CODE § 654.2(d)(1) (West 1990). Some physicians hold ownership interests indirectly. OIG
REPORT, supra note 1, at 19,932.
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(D) This law does not apply to the following types of equity
interest:
(1) The ownership of securities registered with the
Securities and Exchange Commission, or securities of an
entity that has at least $50 million in undepreciated net
tangible health care assets;" 4 or
(2) An interest in real property resulting in a landlord-
tenant relationship between the physician and the entity in
which the equity interest is held, unless the rent is
determined, in whole or in part, by the business volume or
profitability of the tenant, or is otherwise unrelated to fair
market value;215 or
(3) A physician's own practice, whether he is a sole
practitioner or part of a group, when the health care good or
service is prescribed or provided solely for the physician's
own patients and is provided or performed by the physician
or under his supervision.216
(E) Any physician violating the provisions of this section will be
fined $2,500 and may be excluded from the Medicare or Medicaid
programs.
217
(F) This law should not be construed as permitting relationships
or interests that are prohibited "referrals" as defined by the Medicare
and Medicaid Patient and Program Protection Act. 21 1
214. This provision is substantively the same as the safe harbor. 42 C.F.R. § 1001.952(a)
(1992). The connection between payments from large entities to physicians could only remotely be
attributable to referrals. Therefore, payments from large entities do not have to be disclosed.
215. This provision is substantively similar to the federal safe harbor. 42 C.F.R. § 1001.952(b-
d) (1992).
216. Here, there is no need to disclose because this epitomizes the fee-for-service payment
mechanism. The conflict of interest is apparent to the patient. This provision would not encourage
the formation of many small organizations because the equipment costs are too expensive and thus
require pooled physicians' capital.
217. The Medicare and Medicaid Patient and Program Protection Act provides for physician
exclusion. It is important to note that the operative word in this section is 'may'. The Secretary
of the Health and Human Services Department has been given the discretion to exclude a physician
who violates the disclosure law. 42 U.S.C. § 1320a-7(b) (1988).
218. The law's purpose is to provide patients with information to facilitate patient choice among
health care providers.
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C. Comments
Congress should enact the model disclosure law for all Medicare patients
and should mandate its use by the state Medicaid programs as a condition for
receiving Medicaid matching grant funds. 219 Further, Congress should give
the Office of the Inspector General the power to enforce this law, because it
already has developed expertise in this area through its enforcement of the Anti-
Fraud and Abuse Statutes. A possible means of enforcement is to use a negative
audit confirmation request. A random, computer-generated list of Medicare and
Medicaid recipients would be sent a letter asking if their physician had disclosed
to them any financial interests the physician had in entities to which they were
referred. The recipient would only be requested to reply if the physician had
not disclosed financial interests in entities referred. The negative audit
confirmation request is a standard audit technique.
One attribute of the disclosure law is that patients who are armed with
knowledge may better be able to protect themselves from unnecessary and
possibly harmful medical procedures. Also, the Medicare and Medicaid
programs may experience cost savings because patients may forego some
services or find physicians who do not have financial arrangements with
ancillary services. Finally, the model disclosure law has clearly defined terms,
unlike the majority of existing state disclosure laws, so that it can be applied
with ease. The law will be uniform throughout the Medicare and Medicaid
programs.
V. CONCLUSION
Physicians often refer patients to health care entities in which physicians
have a financial or ownership interest. Physicians have aligned themselves with
for-profit health care entities that compete in the market for patients. Currently,
a referred patient is unaware of the conflict of interest that may influence the
physician's judgment as to the quality or medical necessity of treatment. The
proposed Model Physician Conflict of Interest Disclosure Law will add legal
force to the AMA's guidelines and fully apprise the patient of the financial
incentives that may be affecting physicians' decisions. The disclosure law will
facilitate patient autonomy without hindering innovative health care entities.
Carol Michna
219. The federal government has the power to approve the states' Medicaid programs. 42
U.S.C. § 1396 (1988).
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